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World Income Components:
Measuring and Exploiting Internationa l Risk Sharing Opportunitie s

Abstract
We provide methods of decomposing the variance of world
national incomes into components in such a way as to indicate the
most important risk-sharing opportunitie s, and, therefore, the
most important missing internationa l risk markets to establish.
One method uses a total variance reduction criterion, and
identifies risk-sharing opportunitie s in terms of eigenvectors of
a variance matrix of residuals produced when country incomes are
regressed on world income. Another method uses a mean-varianc e
utility-maxim izing criterion and identifies risk-sharing
opportunitie s in terms of eigenvectors of a variance matrix of
deviations of country incomes from their respective contract-yea r
shares of world income.
The two methods are applied using Summers-Hest on [1991] data
on national incomes for large countries 1950-1990, each using two
different methods of estimating variances. While these data are
not sufficient to provide accurate estimates of the requisite
var1ance matrices of (transformed) national incomes, the results
are suggestive of important new markets that could actually be
created, and show that there may be large welfare gains to
creating some of these markets.
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World Income Components:
Measuring and Exploiting Internationa l Risk Sharing Opportunitie s

In this paper, we develop methods for characterizin g the
risk structure of world incomes and for producing definitions of
a small number of securities that will allow us to create new
markets for much of this risk. Our methods are related to
principal components analysis applied to national incomes
(strictly speaking, gross domestic products, GDPs), of the
nations of the world. Our methods take account of the relative
size and variability of different countries' incomes, as well as
the tendency of certain national incomes to move together, to
suggest the most important opportunitie s for risk sharing. Our
methods differ from standard principal components analysis
applied to national incomes in that ours are variance
decompositio ns of risk-sharing opportunitie s, not of national
incomes themselves. Our data consist of the Penn World Table data
on annual real per capita GDPs for the twelve largest (in terms
of 1990 GDP) countries 1950-90, measured in 1985 US dollars; see
Summers and Heston [1991] . 1
A product of our analysis is a set of world income
components, or indexes (that is, linear combinations) of national
incomes, designed to be used as the basis of settlement for risk
management contracts. We will refer to the contracts, claims on
components of world incomes, as income component securities; we

1 our methods have some
similarities to one suggested in the

theoretical paper of Duffie and Jackson [1989].

would expect these contracts to be traded on securities markets
just as other securities are traded today. They might also be
called income component futures contracts and be traded at
futures exchanges. 2 Some of our proposed securities can be
described as insurance policies for certain groups of countries;
calling a security an insurance policy is most appropriate when
the variation in the index is highly negatively correlated with
the income of one country, and the people in that country buy the
security to reduce their income risk. Some of the income
component securities can also be described as swaps of certain
groups of national incomes for other groups; calling a security a
swap is most appropriate when the index gives negative weights to
roughly half of the national incomes. 3 Our analysis does not
begin with any preconceived notions whether we want to create
insurance policies or swaps, or any other instrument: our
analysis goes directly for the most advantageous risk-sharing
arrangement.
Our study of risk-sharing opportunities among national
incomes is potentially very important, since national incomes are

2

The proposed contracts have aspects of both securities and
futures. The "index participations" traded at the American Stock
Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in 1989 are
analogous to the securities defined here; their trading launched
a debate on whether they are securities or futures, and thus on
how they should be regulated; see Shiller [1993a].
3 we

shall see below that even when our optimal securities
can be thought of roughly as insurance policies, those that are
defined by the second of our two methods below are really also
always swaps since a swapping of risks is always involved with an
optimally defined contract.
2

measures of total economic welfare of the countries, and since
there have been historically large variations in real national
incomes.

Moreover, there is very little effective risk

diversification across nations today (see for example Obstfeld
[1993], Tesar and Werner [1993]). We will do a consumer-surplus
analysis below that will further confirm the importance of our
proposed markets.
In Shiller [1993a]

(see also Shiller [1993b])

it was

proposed that markets be established for long-term, even
perpetual, claims on national incomes; it was argued that,
despite some potential problems, such markets are indeed
feasible. Here, our income component securities will be defined
as finite-term,

T-year, claims on the indexes (linear

combinations) of national incomes defined here. In our empirical
work below we will consider securities with T of both ten and
forty years. Ideally, there would eventually be securities for an
array of horizons and for perpetual securities, so that people
with different circumstances in terms of years of life expected
or number of heirs could find a security tailored to their
interests.
Because there do not now exist any markets for national
incomes or for any large income aggregates, when we set up any
such markets we must consider how they would work pretty much in
isolation. Existing markets are very small in comparison:

Our

stock and bond markets are claims on only a tiny fraction of
national incomes; for example, dividends account for only about
3

3% of US national income. Real estate is mostly highly illiquid,
and costly to diversify, and in any event real estate income is
also a small component of national incomes.
In attempting to define a small number of income component
securities markets that will allow maximal risk sharing given the
number of markets, we seek to define the best first market to set
up, as well as the best second or third markets. We assume that
the number of markets introduced must be kept small, especially
at the beginning. By analogy, there are not many stock index
futures markets in the world, indeed, from a world perspective,
not many aggregate liquid risk management markets at all.
Another reason for confining our attention to only one or a
few markets is that it is useful for us to be able to prescribe
in simple terms the most important risk management actions that
should be taken by large groups of people. Simple prescriptions
are what most people take from existing models. The mean-variance
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in finance,

to which our

methods are related, is most often used by practitioners not to
arrive at complicated definitions of optimal portfolios, but just
for the simple prescription that investors should hold the market
portfolio of investable assets, and we now have many indexed
funds that were designed to allow them to do just this. The
problem with this commonly-given prescription is that it is not
really the logical consequence of the foundations of the CAPM,
since it disregards the correlation of investment returns with
innovations in the present value of other income, other income
4

which is much larger in the aggregate than income from existing
investable assets. We seek here to devise methods to replace this
simple prescription associated with the CAPM with a more sensible
simple prescription, though any such prescription cannot be taken
until the new markets are created.
We shall assume that the earnings people make in the new
income component securities markets are consumed, not invested
either in physical capital or in technological research, so that
we do not need to calculate the effects of investments on future
income suggested by models of Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpman
[1991], and Obstfeld [1995]. We also disregard the fact that a
component of national incomes is nontradable, see Baxter, Jermann
and King [1994]. Making adjustments in our analysis for such
considerations is possible; we leave that to future research.
We pursue two approaches to defining world income
components, i. e., income indices, so that long-term claims on
the indices can be traded for risk management. The first (Section
II below) is a pure variance reduction strategy. With this
strategy, in defining the income component securities, we assume
that individuals in each country are interested only in reducing
the variance of their income, and we constrain the ex ante price
of the securities P to equal zero. We seek to define contracts
such that excess demand is zero at a zero initial price for the
securities, for countries that seek only to reduce risk in
trading these securities. We then seek to define a small number
of securities that allow for the most overall risk reduction
5

through risk sharing subject to the restriction on the number of
securities. With this strategy, the method of defining securities
has a clear and simple relation to principal components analysis:
it turns out that the optimal securities are defined in terms of
eigenvectors of a sort of variance matrix of residuals produced
when national incomes are regressed on world income.
A problem with our first method is that it does not allow
any country to pay, in effect, a price, analogous to an insurance
premium or to the schedule of fixed cash transfers that is part
of some swaps between risky assets 4 , to induce another country
to assume some of its risk. The second method (section III below)
is a utility-maximizatio n-based method, that assumes that
countries have known identical utility functions, and derives an
expression for the prices of the income component securities in
general equilibrium. Securities are then defined so as to
maximize social welfare. It turns out that the optimal securities
are defined in terms of eigenvectors of a sort of variance matrix
of deviations of national incomes from their respective contract
year shares of world income. Having made a specification of
utility functions, we are able with our second method to derive
estimates of the consumer surplus generated by the creation of
the new contracts.
In Section IV below, we discuss how to apply our two methods
of defining the income component securities to the data. Two

4 see

Kapner and Marshall [1990] for a description of the
institutional details of such swaps.
6

methods of estimating variance matrices of national incomes are
also used, a method that uses sample moments directly and a
method that uses strong prior restrictions to estimate. In
Section V we present results for both ten countries (unrestricted
variance matrix) and twelve countries (restricted variance
matrix), and in Section VI we interpret these results as
suggesting genuine opportunities for important new markets.

I. Definition of Contracts and Risk Structure
In each of the new markets to be created, income component
securities are to be traded that represent claims on a stream of
world income components, that is, of index values, according to a
standard contract specified by the securities or futures
exchange. 5 At the beginning of a contract in the qth market, at
contract year 0, the long in the contract agrees to pay, each
contract year from t=l to T, an amount Pqt = Pq(l+g)t to the
short in the contract, and to receive from the short Rqt' the
year t "dividend" paid on the income component security, to be
determined in year t according to a linear formula defined in the
contract in year 0. The parameter Pq, which we will call the
price of the contract, and the growth rate g, which we take equal
to the anticipated average growth rate of real per capita gross
domestic products, specified to keep the payment in line with
expected growth of incomes, are specified in the original

5A

table of symbols and a table of basic relations appear
near the end of this paper.
7

contract at year 0. The dividend Rqt is our qth world income
component at year t, a linear function of national incomes
accruing to year O populations in that year. National incomes in
year t accruing to year O populations (which we will refer to
here loosely as national incomes) are taken here to be per capita
gross domestic products in year t times the corresponding
populations of year 0. We will assume that each contract signer
individually can be expected to earn his or her share of the per
capita national income in subsequent years from sources other

than the contracts we define here. The linear function of
national incomes specifying the dividend is defined in the
initial contract at year O so that the present value over T years
of the function is defined to have an expectation, conditional on
information at year 0, of 0. We are assuming here that public
expectations of future real per capita national incomes are
objective public knowledge, so that contracts can be written in
terms of these expectations, though in practice some rough proxy
for the expectations would have to be used by contract designers.
Our use of expectations in the contract definition is essentially
only a normalization rule for price; if contract designers
misrepresent public expectations when they design the contract,
then the result will only be a change in the market-clearing
contract price; the initial contract price at year O will then
not have the interpretation we give it. Even if they do specify
the expectations correctly at year 0, as time goes by, there will
be new information about expected future national incomes, and so
8

the conditional expectations of the present value of the linear
function of national incomes at the future dates will no longer
be zero. New contracts, initiated after year 0 that also expire
at Twill have different prices, and those who entered a contract
at year 0 and wish to get out of the contract before year Twill
have to make a settlement in terms of the new price. However
these future sales are not our focus of attention here. We study
the contracts from the standpoint of the year they are initiated,
year 0, only.
Let us define the lxC random vector X whose cth element, c =
1, ... ,C, is the present value in year 0 (the year the contract is
made) of real per capita national income for country c for the
years 1 through T minus the expectation at year 0 of this present
value, all times population of country c in year 0.

6

Thus,

taking E 0 as the expectations operator conditional on information
available at year 0, we have that E 0X = 0 and the conditional
variance matrix for T-year present value of national incomes
accruing to current populations is Q = E0 (X'X). X will be
redefined as a T x C matrix and Q will have a different
interpretation in Section III below.
The qth income component security has a present value of
dividend payout Rqt'

t

=

l, .. . ,T, equal to

Rq

=

XAq,

where Aq is

a C x 1 element vector whose cth element is the fraction of
national income of country c that is paid as part of the dividend
6 In

practice, we use real gross domestic product to proxy
for national income. We use a constant real discount rate, the
same for all countries, equal in our empirical work below to 2%.
9

on one security in market q. Assuming that there will be Q
different kinds of securities traded, 0 < Q < C, let us create a
Q-element vector R whose qth element is Rq and a C
whose qth column is Aq. Then,

X

Q

matrix A

R equals XA, and R will be the

present value of our desired vector of world income components,

i. e., index values.

(R will be redefined in Section III below as

a T x Q matrix.)
Let us suppose that the portfolio weights A defining the
securities are normalized so that E(R'R) = I, where I is the Q x
Q

identity matrix. This normalization means that the variance of

the present value of T years of dividends (dividends measured in
thousands of 1985 dollars), summing from t

= 1, .. . ,T,

is one,

and the covariances of the present value of T years of dividends
with the present values of T-years of dividends of all other
markets are zero. This normalization has no effect on the
market's ability to form portfolios using the securities. The
normalization will have the effect of tending to make the
elements of A very small, so that contract size is suitable for
trading by individuals.

II. The Pure Variance Reduction Method of Designing Securities
With the pure variance reduction method of this section, we
seek to design income component securities whose price P defined
at the date of the beginning of the contract,

t=O, is zero.

Designing contracts whose price is zero initially is analogous to
underwriters' designing bonds to sell at par on issue. Note that
10

since we have demeaned national incomes, trading in the zero
price contracts at the initial date has no effect on one's
expected, as of that date, present value of future income.
A representative individual in country c seeking at year 0
to hedge his or her income risk can minimize the variance of T
year present value of income in terms of the Q securities by
regressing minus his or her share in the T-year present value of
national income of country c onto the QT-year present values of
dividends. The vector of the sum across all individuals in
country c of theoretical regression coefficients is Pc=
-E(R'R)- 1 E(R'Xc). Since E(R'R) = I,

Pc= -E(R'Xc) = -A'Qc where Qc

is the cth column of Q. The optimal hedge for country c
(individuals in country c considered together) will be to
purchase a number

Pqc

of the qth security so that the unexpected

component of that country's income is offset as well as possible
by opposite dividends in the portfolio of securities, minimizing
the variance of the combined incomes. 7 Let us combine the C
vectors Pc, c = 1, ... ,C into a Q x C matrix P whose qth column is

pq,

and sop= -A'Q. It may seem unrealistic to assume, as we do,

that everyone hedges; however our analysis would have been
unaffected had we assumed that only a fraction of the population
hedges, so long as this fraction did not vary across countries.
Let us now infer how designers of new markets might
construct the Q securities in such a way that they would allow
7R
·
p~ lS measured in units of number of contracts for each
country, so that
will presumably be a very large number, in
contrast to the very small value of Acq·

Pqc

11

r

the best possible compromise over the C countries, for the
purpose of allowing them to hedge well. Obviously, any given
country would prefer that a market be set up specifically for
hedging risks to this country's income, but such a market might
not serve other countries well. To achieve a compromise, we want
to minimize a weighted average of the various countries' hedging
error. This means that the designer must select the matrix A
(select terms of the contract) to minimize, by some metric, the
combined errors made by everyone. The metric for the combined
expected squared errors that we will use is S =
tr(wE 0 ((X+R~) '(X+R~))), where w is a diagonal matrix with

strictly positive elements along the diagonal. Sis the expected
squared error for each country c weighted by we (the cth diagonal
element of w) and summed across countries. In our empirical work
with this method, we will make w = I so that all countries have
the same weight.
Now, note that S = tr(wE 0 ((X+R~)' (X+R~))) = tr(Ml-~'Q) =
tr(Ml) - tr(A'QM2A). To minimize S, we must maximize tr(A'QM2A)
subject to the constraint A'QA =I.Moreover, we have an
additional constraint that the total positions are zero; for
every short there must be a long; this constraint represents the
essential motivation in our analysis that we are looking for
risk-sharing opportunities, not just ordinary principal
components of income. Thus, we have that ~t = 0, where t i s a C x
1 vector of ones.

12

Let us first solve this maximization problem for the case of
only one market, where the matrix A is a column vector. To
maximize subject to the two constraints A'OA = 1 and A'Qt = 0 we
set up the Lagrangian L:
L = A'O wOA -

(A'DA-1) Ji. - (A'O 1) µ (1)

where A andµ are Lagrange multipliers for the two constraints.
Differentiating with respect to A, we derive the first order
condition:
aL/aA = 20 wOA - 20AA - D tµ = 0 (2)

Premultiplying the above equation by A', and, using the facts
that A'Qt = 0 and A'OA = 1, we show that A= A'nwnA =

~wf3';

this

is the total weighted variance reduction, the weighted sum of the
variance reductions across all countries. Premultiplying by t',
we also show, again using A'Qt = 0, thatµ= 2t'~/(t'Qt).
Substituting forµ in equation (2), we find:

so that A is proportional to an eigenvector, and A is the
corresponding eigenvalue, of the matrix that premultiplies A on
the left hand side. It is instructive to write the same equation
in terms of~:

13

(0

-

0 1 (1'0 1) - 1 1'0) wjJ' = M'OMwjJ' =
M = I - 1(1'0 1)-1 1'0

p';.,

(4)

It will be recognized that the matrix M defined in the above
expression is the idempotent matrix such that XM is the matrix
whose ith element is the residual when the ith column of X (ith
country's demeaned present value of income) is regressed on world
present value of income. Thus, M'OM (which equals

OM)

is the

variance matrix of residuals for each country, when each
country's Xis regressed on world present value of income Xt, and
hence, if w = I,

~, is

(proportional to) an eigenvector of this

matrix. Our world income component R is XA (which equals
-.xQ- 1 ~');

this is, if w = I, proportional to the first principal

component of XM, that is to XMj3'. To see this point, write
as

.xn- 10Mf3'

and use the fact that

0Mf3'

=

XMJ3'

~'A

Having solved the one-component case, let us now move to the
general case. Disregarding, for the moment, the constraint that
the A'QA should be diagonal, requiring only that its diagonal
elements be one, we set up the Lagrangian:

where Aq, q = l, .. , Qare Lagrange multipliers for the constraint
that diagonal elements of
1 vector of

A'QA equal one, and whereµ is the Q x

Lagrange multipliers for the market clearing

constraints. Differentiating with respect to the matrix A, we
find:

14

~~ = 20 wOA

- 2QAA - Q 1µ' = o (6)

where A is a Q x Q diagonal matrix with the

Aq

along the

diagonal. Premultiplying (6) by A', we see that A'QAA = A'.Q'MlA..
Premultiplying (6) by t', one finds thatµ' equals
2t',Q'MlA/(t'.Qt). Substituting in (6) forµ',

we then have:

or, in terms of~:
(O

-

a 1 (1'0 1) - 1 1'0) wP'

= M'OMwlJ' = P'A

M= I - 1(1 1 01)- 1 11 0

ca>

Premultiplying (8) by w· 5 , we see from the above expression that

w· 5 ~ has columns proportional to eigenvectors of the real
nonnegative definite symmetric matrix w· 5M'OMw· 5 , and hence

~wf3'

is diagonal. Using~= -A'.Q, we see that A'.Q'MlA is also diagonal,
and hence, using A'QAA = A'.Q'MlA, we see that A'.QA is diagonal
too, so the constraints that were not represented in the
Lagrangian, that off-diagonal elements of A'nA are zero, are
satisfied anyway; A'nA is the identity matrix, and we thus know
that A'.Q'MlA = A. To maximize the trace of A'.Q'MlA. we select the Q
eigenvectors with the highest eigenvalues.
The matrices A and~ are related by a couple of expressions.
The matrix A equals -Mwf3'A- 1 . To see this, note that expression
(7) is M'MlA = AA, and use the fact that QA=~,. Hence, since M
15

is idempotent, MA= A. Let us define a
tt'/C. This is the matrix such that,

cxc

matrix D equal to I

for any vector x, Dx is the

vector x from which the mean of all the elements of x have been
subtracted, i. e., Dx is demeaned x. Note that Dis both
idempotent and symmetric, with rank C-1. Note also that DM = D
and MD= M. It follows that, if w = I as in the empirical work
below,

~,=-DA.A, which means that columns of~, are the same as

columns of A, except that they are demeaned and rescaled by
multiplying by minus the corresponding eigenvalue. To see that~,
= -DAA in this case, note that since, when w = I, A=

= -DMj3'A- 1 ;
~',

-Ml3'A- 1 ,

DA

since DM = D, DA= -D~'A- 1 . Using the fact that D~' =

the result follows. Note also that~= ~D = ~M. Because of

these relations, we can write the portfolio vectors in several
different ways: R = XA = (XM)A = (XM)DA.
I+ A~ is the C x C matrix whose ijth element is the
exposure, after hedging, of country j to country i's risk. If we
include all possible components (that is, setting Q equal to C-1)
so that the (C - 1) eigenvectors of w· 5M'!2Mw· 5 are complete,
then, using (8), we see that M'QM =~'~.Then it can be shown
that, regardless of the weighting matrix w chosen, A~= -Mand
I+A~ = ty where y is the vector of regression coefficients when
each country's present value of real income is regressed on the
present value of world real income, that is, y = (t'Ot)- 1 t'O.
That I+A~ = ty means that each country is holding a portfolio
whose risk is the fitted value of its national income regressed
on world income; everyone is completely diversified and subject
16

to world income risk only. But such diversification does not
generally occur unless we have C-1 markets.
To clarify what we have done, consider the case where the
world consists of four countries, and that the first two
countries are highly correlated with each other, but uncorrelated
with the second two countries. Moreover, the second two countries
are highly correlated with each other and all four countries have
the same variance. Our Q matrix is given by expression (9):
1.0 0.9 0
0
0.9 1.0 0
0
'1=
0
0 1.0 0.9
0
0 0.9 1.0

(9)

Then, M'OM has the form given by expression (10),
.525
.425 -.475 -.475
.425
.525 -.475 -.475
M'OM=
-.475 - .475 .525
.425
- .47 5 -.475 .425
.525

(10)

which has one eigenvalue equal to 1. 9 and two eigenvalues both
equal to 0.1. The vector A, derived as shown above using the
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue is given by
expression (11).

-1
A= .3627

-1

(11)

1
1

Thus, except for scaling, the component may be described as just
a short position in the first two countries and an equal and

17

opposite long position in the other two. This contract is, as we
might expect, a swap between the two blocks of countries. This
component is quite different from the first principal component
of Q. That matrix has two first principal components, both with
the same eigenvalue. These components are proportional to the
vectors [1 1 0 O]' and [0 0 1 1] '; if we created a market in
either of these, then we would not provide any means for the two
groups of countries to swap their risks. The vector~ is given by
expression (12) .

p=

.6892[ 1

1 -1 -1] (12)

The first two countries are short the component, the second two
are long the component.
If we were to create the next two markets, then each of
these markets would entail a swap between the pairs of countries
within one block. The risk reduction afforded by such swaps is
much smaller because the countries are so highly correlated
within each pair.
It is instructive to look at the matrix I+ A~ whose ith
column gives the exposure of country i to risks in each of the

18

four countries after hedging in the one market, expression (13).
Not all elements of this matrix equal .25, as would be the case
if we had included all three possible markets and thereby spanned
the world risk sharing opportunities, resulting in each country's
holding one quarter of the world. Since we have only one market
for trading income, it is not possible for each country to hold

.75 -.25 .25
.25
-.25 .75
.25
.25
I+AP =
.25
.25
.75 -.25
.25
.25 -.25 .75

(13)

the world income, but the holdings shown in expression (13) do
nearly as well for risk reduction, given the covariance matrix Q
that was assumed. For example, for country 1 the holding of .75
times its own income minus .25 times country two's income is
almost as good as the holding of .25 times its own income and .25
times country two's income, given the high correlation between
the two.
Suppose, to pursue this example further,

that we changed the

weight matrix w from the identity matrix to a matrix that gives
much more weight to the first two countries, but keeping the
weights constant within each country pair. This change in weights
would have no effect on any of our optimal securities. Even if
the contract designer cares primarily about the variance
reduction of the first two countries, there is still nothing
better that the market designer confined to one market can do for
them than create a swap between this pair of countries and the
19

other pair. And, if there is to be a second market, the best that
can be done is to have a swap between the first two countries; if
a third market, between the last two countries. If, on the other
hand,

the contract designer cares primarily about the first

country, giving much more weight to it and equal weight to the
other three countries, then the optimal first market will look
very different; it will be approximately a swap between the first
country and the rest of the world. Thus, giving unequal weight to
countries that are in groupings within which countries are highly
correlated with each other can break the grouping up for contract
definition.
We note, finally,

that with the pure variance reduction

method there is a convenient way of measuring the importance of
each market. We can regress the cth country's national income on
the qth world income component, and take the variance of the
fitted value in this simple regression, as the explained sum of
squares for that country and market; this variance is just ~ic·
Since all of the components are independent of each other, the
sum of these variances (L(q=l, .. . Q)~ic) is the variance of the
fitted value in a multiple regression on all of the components;
if we add to this variance the variance of the residual in the
regression, we get the total sum of squares, which is just
var(Xq). In our empirical work below we will show for each
market, as a measure of its importance, the explained sum of
squares as a percent of the total sum of squares.
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III. A Utility Maximization Method for Defining Securities
A problem with the assumptions that led to the above-defined
income component securities is that it was assumed that no
country could pay, in effect, an insurance premium to another
country to assume some of its risk. In the above framework,

if,

let us suppose, there were one country whose national income had
no risk at all, and another with high risk, there would be no
opportunity for risk sharing between them. In this example and
the pure variance reduction framework,

the country with no

uncertainty could achieve no further reductions in uncertainty,
and so would not be interested in making any risk-sharing
arrangements. In fact, however, it is logical that a country that
had no risk could be induced to bear a little risk in exchange
for an increase in the expected value of its income.
We now hypothesize that individuals in all countries share
the same mean-variance utility function. We allow P, the vector
of prices of the Q securities arrived at at time 0, to be
nonzero. We derive the demand for each income component security
by all countries, and derive the market clearing price. The
contract designer, assumed to know the utility functions, chooses
a number Q of income component securities to maximize a weighted
sum of the expected utilities, i. e., to maximize a social
welfare function. Note the difference from the analysis of the
preceding section, where the contract designer was required to
find securities such that the markets would clear at a zero price
for countries interested only in reducing variance.
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The utility function that we hypothesize (the same for
individuals in all countries) is:

where ute is felicity, or instantaneous utility, of an individual
in country cat year t, and pis the discount rate, i. e.,
subjective rate of time preference. The felicity ute is defined
by the function of mean and variance:

Ute

=

COflStantte

+

Yte

a var (Yte)
2 (Yoe ( 1 +g) t)

(15)
(a+l)

where Yte is the mean, the expectation conditional on information
at year O (contract date) of country e's real per capita income,
and var(Yte) is the variance conditional on information at year 0
of country e's real per capita income at year t. The term
Yoe(l+g)t, where we take Yoe to be, for each country c, its 1990

per capita income (for the CIS, 1989 income) in US 1985 dollars,
enters the expression for proper scaling of the mean and
variance, taking account of the standard of living of the
country. The coefficients chosen for the mean and variance of Yte
may be motivated approximately as coming from a linearization of
constant relative risk aversion felicity for an individual at
time t in country c, U(Yte) = ( (Yte) (l-a)_l) / (1-a) around
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Yoc(l+g)t, where

a is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative

risk aversion.

Strictly speaking, the linearization of u(Ytc)

would have an additional term, a deterministic term in (Ytc Including this term in the felicity function would
destroy linearity of the demand functions, and thereby create
large complications in our analysis; in any event if prices paid
are not too large (as shares of national incomes) the term is
small. For this reason, it is customary with the capital asset
pricing model in finance to omit this term.
Let us define the TxC random matrix X whose tcth element is
real per capita national income Ytc at year t

for country c minus

the expectation at year O (the date the contract is made) of this
national income, times population in country c in year O; as
above this is assumed to be national income accruing to
population in year O who sign the contract. The qth security is
assumed to be a claim for each year t

= 1, ... ,Ton income equal

in amount to the tqth element of the linear combination XA of
incomes.

8

The vector P has qth element equal to the price of the

qth security. Note that these prices can be both positive or
negative; in this sense they may be considered as analogous to
the fixed schedule of cash transfers that are seen on certain
swaps between risky assets; both sides of the contract are

8

rn this section on mean-variance utility, we use bars
over symbols A, M, ~ and y that will be compared with variables
in the preceding section on pure variance reduction; for
simplicity we omit bars over R, S, w, X, Aq, A, and Q even though
their values too may differ from those of corresponding symbols
in the preceding section.
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contractually committed to the contract; there is not free
disposal, and so there is no problem with negative prices. There
is, in fact, a fundamental arbitrariness in the sign of
eigenvectors, and the sign of each element of P depends on the
choice made for the sign of the eigenvector; in our empirical
results presented below we choose the sign to make all prices
nonnegative.
For country cat year t we have that the hedging reduces
expected income xtc by the purchase price times the number of
contracts, that is, by ~~P(l+g)t. The variance var(xtc) of income
after everyone hedges is
t=l, ... , T (16)

where Qtcc is the cth diagonal element of Qt

and Qtc

is the cth

column of Qt· Let us define Q for the utility maximization method
as the discounted sum, using discount factor h =
1/((l+p) (l+g)a+l), of the variance matrices for national incomes

t periods hence, Q = L(t=l, .. . ,T)htnt. Since, with demeaned X,
E 0X = 0, Q equals E 0 (X'GX) where G is a diagonal matrix whose tth

diagonal element is ((l+p) (l+g)a+l)-t. The normalization we choose
for A is A'QA =I.To derive the demands for the securities by
all individuals in country c, we convert our expressions for mean
and variance into per capita measures, substitute them into the
mean-variance utility function, multiply by population, take the
present value overt= 1, .. . ,T, use this definition of Q, and
differentiate with respect to ~c· The demand is then found to be:
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where T

=

(v-vT+l)

I

(l-v)

and v

=

l / ( (l+p) (l+g)a-l),

so that Tis

the present value of a T-year $1 annuity discounted using
discount factor v. Note that demand in market q is not affected
by prices in the other markets; this property of demand is a
consequence of the fact that the dividends on the securities are
constructed to be uncorrelated with each other, and of the mean
variance utility assumption. This demand curve implies that
country c will purchase more of the security the lower the price
and the lower the country's covariance with the security. It will
hold a positive quantity of a security at a positive price only
if the covariance is sufficiently negative so that the security
is providing enough risk reduction to the country to warrant
paying the price. Note also that a country whose own income is
riskless will hold negative quantities of all securities, that
is, be a seller of securities,

(since we are normalizing all

securities to have nonnegative price). This means that in terms
of these markets it is strictly in the insurance business, of
accepting risk in return for an insurance premium.
Representing this demand function for all countries, using
the matrix~ whose cth column is the demand for country c, we
have:

p = -A'O - Pl'x/f/a
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(18)

where x 0 is a diagonal matrix whose cth diagonal element is xoc·
The vector of prices Pis determined so that the total
demands for the securities is zero, i. e., so that

~l

= 0. Using

this market-clearing condition and solving for the price vector P
we find:
p = -aA'01 ( Tt'Xol)

-l

{19)

This means that the price of the ith security is the average,
over all countries, of the (weighted present value,

t = 1, ... ,T)

covariance of that securities' linear combination of incomes with
the incomes of the countries, divided by the average x 0 c,
multiplied by -a, and divided by

T.

A security whose dividend

correlates positively with the average country's income will have
a negative price, a security whose dividend correlates negatively
with the average country's income will have a positive price; we
are normalizing the contracts so that price will always be non
negative, and so that no contract's dividend correlates posi
tively with the average country's income. The price of the qth
security is zero if the sum over the C countries of the regres
sion coefficients of country e's income on Rq equals zero. 9

9

Note that the four-country example presented in the
preceding section in connection with expression (9) applies here
with the utility maximization method too if all four countries
have same x 0 c, since then M = M. This is then an example where P
= 0 even in our utility maximization case.
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A special case will help clarify the general equilibrium
that we have just derived. Suppose that there are only two
countries, that a=l and T = 1. Suppose also that only the first
country has any uncertainty; therefore, since A'ni = 1, the
vector A must have first element equal to ±1/cr 1 where cr1 =
(the other element is irrelevant, ~

2

i2:ii

is zero). Resolving the

sign ambiguity with principal components, let us choose the minus
sign so that price will be positive. It follows from expression
(19) that P = cr1 /(x01 + x 02 ). The amount of the security purchased
by the first

(risky) country is, from expression (18), Px02 ; the

amount purchased by the other country is of course the negative
of this. After hedging, the risk is borne by the two countries in
proportion to their incomes (at the point of linearization), so
that the ratio of post-hedging standard deviation to income (at
the point of linearization) is equalized across countries. The
value in year O of the "insurance premiums" that are paid is ~ 1P
and total insurance premiums divided by the income of country two
is (crf/.zj 1 )/(l+x02 /x01 ) 2 . If the second (riskless) country is much
smaller than the first,

then the total value of the insurance

premiums divided by national income of the second country will be
large, approaching crf/.zj 1 as we decrease x 02 to zero, but the
amount of risk shared will be small relative to the national
income of the first country. This is as we might expect: there is
no way that a large risky country can improve its situation very
much if the only other country is very small, and it can make a
big difference to the small country to accept a small part of the
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large country's risk. If the second (riskless) country is larger
than the first,

then the "insurance premium" will be small,

approaching zero relative to either country's income as x 02 is
increased to infinity, and the first country will get rid of
almost all of its risk. This too is as we might expect: the risk
suffered by the small country is easily borne by the larger
country, and since the risk is small for the larger country it is
willing to bear it for a small total value of insurance premiums.
Let us now consider the contract designer's problem, which
is to define a small number Q of securities so as to maximize a
weighted sum of utilities, a sort of social welfare function. We
assume that the contract designer wishes to choose A to
maximize: 10
C

S = ~ wcuc (20)
c=l

where we is the weight in the social welfare function on country

c. Letting w denote the CxC diagonal matrix whose cth diagonal

10 rn

future research, we might represent the contract
designer as also maximizing with respect to the time schedule of
price payments, which we have here exogenously set as growing at
rate g. Since we do not represent credit markets in our model,
choosing the wrong time path for price payments in the contracts
may make the contracts less effective. The paths through time t,
t = 1, .. . ,T of the conditional variance matrix of income Qt and
of the expectation of future income EoXt could be modelled, and
the optimal time schedule of price payments would generally
depend on these paths.
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element is the weight given to the utility of country c, we can
rewrite this social welfare function as:

where Yo is a C x C matrix whose cth diagonal element, c =
1, .. . ,C is the real per capita income in country c in year O and
where the constant does not depend on A. If one substitutes our
expression for

P and

regroups, one finds that this expression

reduces to:

s =constant+

(a/2) tr(wy0-"x0-

1--

P'P).

(22)

Thus, to maximize the social welfare function one need only
maximize tr(wyoaxo 1
constraints:

P=

P'P)

with respect to A subject to the three
P = -a.A'Qt(Tt'x0 t)- 1 ,

-(A'Q+TPt'x0 /a),

and A'DA

= I.

Substituting the second constraint into the first, we find

that

P'

=

-A'OM where

Mis defined as I - t(t'x0 t)- 1 t'x0 . The CxC

matrix Mis not the same as the matrix Min the preceding
section, though it too is idempotent, of rank C-1. Substituting
=

-A'OM then into

tr(wyoaxo 1

P'P),

we find that we are left with

the problem of maximizing tr(wyoaXo 1M'nii'OM) =
tr(A'0MwyoaXo 1.M'OA) subject to the single constraint that A'DA =

I.

To maximize we set up, as in the preceding section, the
Lagrangian that represents the constraint that diagonal elements
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P

A'OA equal 1, but that disregards the constraints that off

of

diagonal elements equal 0:

where

Aq

is the Langrange multiplier for the constraint that the

qth diagonal element of

A'OA equals 1. Differentiating with

respect to the matrix A and setting the derivative to zero, we
find the first order condition:

where A is a diagonal matrix whose qth diagonal element is
Since

P'

=

Aq.

-M'OA, this equation can be rewritten in terms of P:

from which it can be seen that (wy0ax01 )

· 5 ~'

has columns

proportional to eigenvectors of the matrix
(wy0ax01 )

· 5 iJ'Q.vi(wy

1 ) .S.

0ax0

Since this matrix

lS

nonnegative

definite symmetric, P'wyoaxa 1 P' is diagonal. Using P' =
see that

A'

I

-M'OA, we

A'.D.Mwyoaxa 1 M'OA is also diagonal. Premultiplying (24) by

we see that

A'D.Mwyaaxo 1 M'ni

= A'.QiA,

and so

A'OA is diagonal

too, and the constraints omitted from the maximization problem
above, that off-diagonal elements are zero, are satisfied anyway.
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The matrix

M'OM is a sort of present value (using discount

factor h = 1/((l+p) (l+g)a+l) of the variance matrices t = 1, ... ,T
of the vector of national incomes minus their corresponding
shares of world income. For country c, the excess national income
is computed as that country's national income minus its share of
world income, the latter defined as Ye= x 0 c/(t'x0 t), so that the
share is determined in terms of our point of linearization, here
1990 real per capita GDPs. This is in contrast to the preceding
section, where M'OM was the variance matrix of present values (t
= 1, .. . T) of residuals of real per capita national incomes
regressed on the present value (t = 1, ... T) of world real per

capita incomes.
We now show that all of our contracts designed by the
utility maximization method will be essentially swaps. First note
that as in the preceding section, the matrices A and~ are
related by a couple of expressions. Premultiplying (24) by
and using~=

,n-l

-A'OM, we see that the matrix A equals

-Mwyoaxo 1 ~'A- 1 . Hence, since Mis idempotent, MA= A. It follows,
since t'x0 M = 0, that t'x0 A = 0. This means that the sum of the
contract shares of national incomes times the corresponding base
year income will be zero. We cannot have a situation in which all
elements of a column of A are positive, as was a possibility with
the A matrix defined from the pure variance reduction method.
Note that DM = D, where D = I - tt'/c is as above. Note also
that~= ~D = ~M. Because of these relations, we can write the
portfolio vectors in several different ways: R = XA = (XM)A =
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(XM)DA. In words, it does not matter whether the data that are

used to construct the dividends are first corrected by
subtracting from each country its share of world income or if in
this case the A is also demeaned by column.
We can now produce measures that place a dollar value on the
availability of these income component securities; given our mean
variance utility function,

these measures might be called either

consumer surplus or equivalent variation or compensating
variation; with mean-variance utility the measures are identical.
For each of the Q securities and each of the C countries we can
calculate the value in time O dollars of the utility change, by
calculating what decrement in time O income would just offset the
utility increase. Putting it another way, we can calculate, in
~qc -

Pq

space, the area of the triangle bounded by the

equilibrium price Pq, the line ~qc = 0 and the linear demand
curve given by equation (18). Note that this consumer surplus
includes both the value of the variance reduction caused by the
hedging and the value of the price received (if the country was a
net seller of securities, as when the country was serving as an
insurer of other countries' risks). The QxC matrix F whose qcth
element is total dollar value of the utility gained by using
market q by country c as a fraction of GDP (x0 c) is given by:
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where the exponentiation is element-by-element, that is, for
country c and income component security q, the consumer surplus
is just (a/(2)) (~qclxocc)

2

•

Note that this expression gives us the

total dollar present value of felicity gains in all future
periods t = 1, .. . ,T as a fraction of expected income in the base
year only; to convert this to a fraction of GDP paid each year t
= 1, .. . ,Tone would have to divide by

T. 11

Note also that the

weighted sum, weighted using the weights for each country given
by the matrix w, of all the elements of the matrix F defined in
expression (26) equals the expression maximized above,

tr(A'00wy-oaxa 1.M'OA), see expression (23), times a constant. The
first market thus maximizes the weighted sum of the consumer
surpluses divided by national incomes for one market, the second
the weighted sum of the consumer surpluses divided by national
incomes for the second market, and so on. Thus, of course, when
we choose was something other than

Y'5x01 ,

thereby choosing to

maximize a weighted sum, not the simple sum, of consumer
surpluses divided by national incomes, our apparent success in
generating consumer surplus by creating only a few markets, to
someone viewing a table presenting a matrix F such as appears
below, will not be as high as it could be.

11 For

example, in our Tables II and III below, when T = 40,
one would divide by T = 11.48. Such a calculation would give that
constant fraction of income that would be deducted each period t
= 1, .. . ,T to just offset the overall utility gain from creating
the new markets. Because of the heavy discounting in our Table II
and III results, this fraction would tend to be far below the
value of felicity gained as a fraction of income in that year for
years near the end, near year T.
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IV. Data Analysis
Time series plots of the ten-year growth rates of real per
capita GDP series for the ten largest countries for which we have
GDP data 1950-1990 are shown in Figure 1. It is immediately
apparent that there has been a lot of variability of these growth
rates for certain countries. In Japan, the growth rates have
varied from 26%% to 153%. In Brazil, they have ranged from -8% to
nearly 99%. Plainly, changes in income of these magnitudes over
ten-year intervals matter a lot to those receiving the income,
and sharing the risk of such changes would have proven very
beneficial to these people. These fluctuations in GDPs are very
real; this is in contrast to the earthquakes or meteor impacts
that theoretical economists often tell stories about, but which
appear never in history to have caused economic dislocations that
were remotely as big.
It is also apparent that the different countries have
substantially different income growth paths through time, and
that there is no simple shared pattern to the growth paths that
would inspire confidence that we know how to forecast them far
out. It is also apparent from the plots that there is a tendency
for neighboring countries to be substantially positively
correlated with each other, and that distant countries may be
uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with each other. Some
correlations are estimated to be negative: India and Japan happen
to show large negative correlation over this period. Because
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there is not much information about correlations in these data,
which are dominated by low-frequency movements and for which we
have no secure model, we cannot attach much confidence that
national incomes in these countries really tend to move opposite
each other.
For our analysis, we must convert these general impressions
into some estimates of the matrices Q.

Estimating the variance

matrices is not a trivial matter; these are supposed to reflect
the conditional variance at the time of the contract for distant
future national incomes. To estimate such a variance matrix, we
need first to form some representation of the conditional
expected value each year for all future national incomes, a
problem that the world's macroeconomic forecasters have been
spending decades to develop.
There are very many models that might be used to provide
estimates of Q. Estimating time series models, such as
autoregressive models, for the national income of each country
would help us to separate out which components of national
incomes are forecastable and which are not. There is, however, a
risk inherent in specifying any simple autoregressive model, that
it will not capture accurately the long-term risks that we want
to hedge.

Estimating spatial models, such as the spatial

autoregressive models or other Markov random field models, would
allow us to put structure on the matrix Q so that fewer
parameters would be estimated, so that our shortage of
information about long-run risks would present less of an
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estimation problem. Spatial models could use sophisticated
concepts of economic distance between countries, or prior
information about the similarity of different countries. There is
a risk in any spatial model specification, though, that we may be
using the wrong measure of economic distance between countries,
and therefore impose incorrect priors or restrictions on our
variance matrices.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to set forth a
definitive treatise on how to estimate Q; we leave that for
possible future work. For this paper we used two very simple
methods to estimate, methods that appear to be transparent and
fairly robust to many kinds of possible misspecification, with
the hope that our estimates will be at least suggestive of the
new markets that may be created. Our methods of producing the Q
matrices will at least capture in some fashion the magnitude of
variability of national incomes, the tendency for much of this
variability to be idiosyncratic, and the tendency for some
measure of comovement across countries, even if the estimated
matrices are not highly accurate. At this stage in our research,
we approach the problem in almost the same spirit that real
business cycle modelers have who "calibrate" their models. We are
hoping to tell a simple story that has an important element of
truth in it, and are not now particularly interested in testing
our variance matrix model against general alternatives; even if
the model were rejected the estimated Q may yet be useful for our
purposes.
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Our two methods of estimating

,Q

differ in what they assume

about the representativeness of past historical movements for the
future. Our Method A, which involves estimating simple
unconstrained variance matrices from historical data, makes no
assumptions about similarities of or economic distances between
countries. This method, since it requires a lot of data, is used
only for a rather low
T,

T,

equal to ten years; even with this low

we do not expect to get accurate estimates of variances. 12

Our Method B, which involves estimating constrained variance
matrices, imposes some strong priors and thereby saves degrees of
freedom so that we have better prospects of estimating variance
matrices with high T; with Method B we use T equal to forty
years. Neither method makes use of time series models to infer
conditional moments; both are based on the assumption that
conditional variances of long-horizon changes in income are best
estimated directly as moments of long-horizon changes themselves.
Our motivation is the notion, based on our reading of other's

12 we have only four
nonoverlapping time intervals with which

to compute variances of ten-year present values. Supposing that
the variables are normal and independent across the four time
intervals, and approximating our variance as estimated from four
such observations, then the variance estimate will be
proportional to a x2 variate with three degrees of freedom, and
an 80% confidence interval for a standard deviation is from 80%
of the estimated standard deviation to 262% of the estimated
standard deviation. We have not tried to produce standard errors
for our variance matrices, since such standard errors would
depend on the assumed model for our processes and there are many
possible models to which we at this point attach prior
probability. Further refinement of our knowledge about Q is left
to later work.
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success in forecasting,

that ten- or forty-year changes in

national incomes are virtually unforecastable.
Method A. For the pure-variance-reduction calculations, to
estimate Q, we take the sample variance matrix for the C
countries of GDP 1990 x(L(i=l, ... ,T)gdpt+i/((l+p)igdpt) with sample
period t = 1950, ... , 1990-T, 41-T observations, where GDP denotes
total, not per capita, gross domestic product in 1990 (in 1985
dollars), and gdpt denotes real per capita gross domestic product
in year t
estimate

(in 1985 dollars).
Qi,

For the utility-maximizing case, to

i = l, ... ,10, we take the sample variance matrix for

the C countries of GDP 1990 x(gdpt+i/gdpt) with sample period t =
1950, ... ,1990-i, 41-i observations. We then form our estimated Q
as L(t=l, ... ,T)Qt/((l+p) (l+g)a.+l)t.
Method B. With this our second method of estimating Q, we
impose prior restrictions that all countries have the same mean
and variance of percentage changes in real per capita income, and
that covariances are determined solely by the geographic
distances between countries. The motivation for requiring that
all countries have the same mean and variance of percentage
changes of real per capita income is some skepticism that the
past exigencies that faced particular countries 1950-90 can
really be expected to repeat in those same countries in the
future. Our figures show that Japan has had much higher growth
rates than most of the other countries. Do we really have reason
to expect that growth rates will be similarly higher in the
future in Japan?

Our figures suggest that Japan and Brazil are
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risky countries. Do we really have any reason to think that these
countries will be the ones facing the greatest risks in the
future? Perhaps they are just buffeted by some major crises in
this sample, crises the likes of which may just as well strike
other countries in the future. The motivation for requiring that
the correlation across countries in changes in real per capita
income depends only on the distance between the countries is much
the same, we do not really attach much credence to the suggestion
of simple variance matrices computed by Method A that India and
Japan should be expected to be negatively correlated in the
future.
Our prior assumptions for Method B about the variance matrix

V of T-year percentage changes in real per capita national
incomes are represented by the formula:

a - bd1.J
..

b?.O

where d,1.J• is the distance between countries i and j, measured as
air miles between the major city in the respective countries. We
used the air mile distances between the major cities Montreal,
Mexico City, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Calcutta, Tokyo, Paris,
Berlin, Rome, London, Shanghai, and Moscow. Since bis positive,
the further away the major city, the less is the covariance with
its country. This formula corresponds to a valid (i. e, the
variance matrix is nonnegative definite for any placement of
cities) isotropic (i. e., the model is invariant to rotations of
the coordinate system) spatial model where the cities lie in ~ 2 ,
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see Cressie [1991, p. 86]. The formula also corresponds to a
valid isotropic spatial model where the cities lie on the surface
of a sphere and distances are measured along great circles, as in
our application to the earth. Moreover, the variance matrix is
strictly positive definite unless two cities coincide.

This

formulation restricts all covariances to be positive. The prior
restriction that all covariances are positive may seem strong,
but it is maintained here as a sort of common sense prior notion
that there is really no reason in general for any pairs of
countries to tend to move opposite each other. This restriction
may serve to reduce the possibilities for diversification, by
eliminating the negative correlations that diversifiers seek.
For the pure variance reduction case, we compute the constrained
maximum likelihood (multivariate normal) variance matrix V for
the 10 countries of zc

=

L(i=l, .. . ,T)gdp 1990 /(gdp 1990 _i(l+p)i)

c

=

1, ... ,10; there is only one observation of zc for each country,
but there are only three unknown parameters of the utility
function, a, b, and the mean growth rate. Using the estimated
parameters, a, and b, and the mean growth rate, and then using
distance data and real national income data for China and the CIS
(the latter including the Baltic countries, so that it
corresponds to the former Soviet Union), we construct using (27)
a twelve by twelve Vmatrix for the twelve countries, and using
the Summers-Heston data for real GDP for all countries in 1990,
we construct a twelve by twelve x 0 matrix for all twelve
countries. Then we take Q = x 0 vx0 . For the utility-maximizing
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case, to estimate Vi,

i = l, ... ,40, we take the maximum

likelihood variance matrix for the 10 countries of
(gdp1990/gdp1990-i), one observation for each country. We construct
the forty twelve by twelve Vi matrices as we did in the pure
variance reduction case, and the resulting forty variance
matrices are each multiplied by ((l+p)-i(l+g)-(a+l)i)) and summed
to produce our estimate of V; Q is then taken to be x 0 v.x0 .
Note that the maximum likelihood method will tend to produce
downwardly biased estimates of variance, since with only one
observation for each country, the estimated mean will tend to
pick up the component of the variation that is shared by all
countries; recall that in the iid case the maximum likelihood
estimate of variance is sum of squared residuals divided by N
rather than N-1. The downward bias will be more severe here than
in the iid case, since our countries are positively correlated
with each other by assumption. Still, the maximum likelihood
estimate is the posterior mode based on uninformative priors, and
we think that this conservative estimate of variance is
acceptable for our purposes.
Our methods also require that we specify a weighting matrix
w for our maximization problems that define the contract weights,

that are represented in the matrices A and A. In our pure
variance reduction method, we take the matrix w to be the
identity matrix I: we are merely minimizing total variance. This
weighting matrix preserves a simple correspondence between our
method and principal components analysis. In our utility
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maximizing approach, we use two different w matrices. One of
these is

w =

y'sx0 ; this matrix gives most weight to the large

countries in terms of real gross domestic product. We used this
matrix because we think that large wealthy countries provide more
fertile ground for establishing innovative new markets; we want
the benefits of the new markets to be large there. Moreover, with
w =

Y5Xo

thew matrix and the y 0ax01 matrix cancel in the matrix

whose eigenvectors we take, making for the closest parallel with
the pure variance reduction method here. The other w we will use
for the utility maximization method is the identity matrix I.
This allows our method to downweight the people in wealthier
countries, effectively since their marginal utilities of income
are lower than with those in the poorer countries; they tend to
benefit less from risk management. This weighting scheme is
implied by our interpretation of our mean-variance utility
function as a linearization of a constant-relative-risk-aversion
utility function with coefficient of relative risk aversion, a.
This choice of weights will mean that should two countries,
identical in terms of per capita income, be lumped together, then
our analysis would yield the same results as if the two countries
were treated separately; we are really maximizing the total
utility of individuals, under the assumption that individuals
within each country are identical.
We must finally specify the anticipated growth rate g, the
risk aversion parameter a, and the discount rate p for our
analysis.

We took g equal to the average real per capita growth
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rate of all ten countries from 1950 to 1990, 3.07% per year
(except in Table IV). Empirical studies have found wildly
different estimates of risk aversion parameter a and the discount
rate p, depending on the kind of circumstances that generate the
data, see Thaler [1990]. Values of a have been estimated in the
100s, but these may be regarded as implausibly high; we chose a
equal to three as representing a sort of consensus by many who
work in this literature as a reasonable value to assume. We
believe that the high discount rates that are sometimes estimated
are evidence of judgmental errors that people often make, rather
than true preferences. As Pigou [1934] argued long ago, people
appear to have a "telescopic faculty" that is defective, causing
them sometimes to underestimate the importance of the future. We
assume that on decisions as important as hedging the standard of
living, people will behave more rationally, and use a rather low
discount rates, which we have set at 2%.
In an important sense, our choice of g, a, and pimply
implausibly high discounting. The figures we have specified would
imply, using the constant relative risk aversion utility
function, that the risk-free real interest rate would be
(l+p) (l+g)a-1,

or 11.7% per year, far above historical averages.

This implausibly high implied risk-free rate is part of the
equity-premium puzzle presented by Mehra and Prescott [1985]
There does not appear to be any agreed-upon way to deal with this
puzzle; we have dealt with this problem only in a rough way by
presenting one last table that substitutes an expected growth
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rate g of zero in place of the 3.07% used in the other tables, so
that the puzzle is resolved by supposing that people do not
expect past growth rates to continue.

V. Results
We present results (with Q = 2, two markets and the
parameter values described above) for the pure variance reduction
method and w = I, Table I; for the utility maximization method
and w =

.l"6x0 ,

Table II; and for the utility maximization method

with w = I, Table III. Finally, we present utility maximization
results using w =
Table IV.

.l"6x0

where the growth rate g is set to zero,

In each table, the results are presented first for

variance matrix estimation method A (unconstrained) and ten
countries, and second for variance matrix estimation method B
(constrained) and twelve countries.
The estimated

.Q

matrices (not shown), whether constrained or

unconstrained, show that near neighbors tend to have higher
correlations than do more distant countries. 13 With the
unconstrained variance matrices, covariances are usually positive
with the exception of India, whose covariance is estimated to be
negative with most other countries. With the constrained variance
matrix estimates, all covariances are constrained to be positive.
For the pure variance reduction case and constrained variance
matrix estimate, corresponding to Table I panel B, the estimated

13 An

appendix showing detailed results is available from the

authors.
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correlation between (forty-year present values of income in) the
US and Canada is 0.88, between France and Germany is 0.80,
between China and Japan 0.65. The estimated correlation between
distant countries is quite small: the correlation between the US
and Japan is 0.07, between the US and the CIS is 0.16, between
the CIS and China is 0.19. India of course no longer has negative
correlation with anyone: its correlation with China is estimated
at 0.43, with Japan, 0.28, with the United States, 0.04. The
pattern of correlations is similar in the utility maximization
case, panels B of Tables II, III and IV.
The optimal contracts shown in these tables are difficult to
summarize. The contract definitions involve all countries, with
varying weights, and so there is no simple way to describe them
accurately in a few words. Moreover, the positions that countries
take in these contracts are not the same as their weights in the
contract definitions. In Table I where~, is proportional to a
matrix of eigenvectors of M'OM and Table II and Table IV where~
is proportional to an eigenvector of M'OM, the columns of~, and
~, are proportional to demeaned columns of -A and

-A

respectively. In these tables, therefore, the positions of most
countries have the opposite sign of the corresponding weights in
the contract definition, though this is not true for all
countries whose contract weight is near the mean weight across
countries in that market. In Table III, the relation between
contract weights and positions is much less clear: countries with
little weight in the contract definition sometimes taking large
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positions, countries with large weight in the contract definition
taking small positions.
Let us make some broad generalizations about these contracts
in terms of the contract weights, that is, in terms of the
columns of A and

A.

In Tables I, II and IV, where large wealthy

countries dominate in determining our results, the first contract
can be described in rough terms as approximately a swap between
US and the Far East (in panels A, the Far East is represented
only by Japan, in panels B by Japan and China), though in Table I
panel A Germany also plays an important role. The second market
in Tables I, II and IV is less easily described. In panels B,
where we have added China and the CIS, the second market might be
described in simple terms as a swap between the European
community and CIS on one side, and China, Japan and the US on the
other. In panels A of Tables I, II and IV, however, the swaps
tend to put a lot of weight on Brazil. In Table III, where the
utilities are unweighted, so that poorer countries become more
important, the first market tends to be approximately a swap
between the poorest country (in per capita income) and the rest
of the world, the second market a swap between the second-poorest
country and the rest of the world.
Part of these results can be understood in terms just of the
scale of the individual countries, to the extent that covariances
are not of dominant importance. Scale can be measured in
different ways, either in terms of the variance of the national
income, or in terms of the per capita income, or in terms of the
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population. Scale as measured by variance is useful in
understanding the unconstrained variance matrix results with ten
countries (Panels A). Japan has the highest variance of present
value of national income, the US the second highest, and Brazil
the third highest.

(The United States is a low estimated variance

country in terms of percentage changes in GDP, but it makes up
for this in terms of sheer size, making our measured uncertainty
about United States GDP the second largest of the ten.) Per
capita income and sheer population matters greatly in our
unweighted utility maximization results, Table III. India matters
vastly more than any other country: it had a 1990 population over
three times that of the next most populous country (the United
States) in our list of ten countries and a per capita income only
a little over a quarter that of the next-poorest of our ten
countries, Brazil. The first market is obviously a swap of
India's national income for the rest of the world's income; all
the countries other than India have virtually the same
coefficient in the first column of the A matrix; in this sense
the contract is plainly designed for India's benefit. The market
benefits India substantially, both in terms of the variance
reduction it permits for India and from the price it receives for
selling contracts, starting at a real $48.17 (in 1985 dollars,
Table III panel A) for the first year for each contract,
amounting to a real $13.47 per person in India, and growing at
3.07% per year thereafter.
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Note that with these utility maximization method results
using aw matrix that gives so much weight to one poor country,
the ratio of wei'ghts A (other country)l /A (India)l for the fi'rst
security are very nearly a/(1-a) where a is India's share in
world income as measured by our x 0 matrix. It might seem obvious
that a contract that was expressly designed for India should be a
swap of India's national income for the world. But it should be
remembered that our contract design method took into account the
willingness of other countries to take the other side of India's
positions, and the benefit to India of the price received. One
might have thought that the other side of the swap would not be
equal shares in all national incomes (which gives smaller
countries less impact on the swap regardless of their covariance
with other countries) but instead some variance-minimizing
portfolio of national incomes. One might have thought that with
our unconstrained variance matrix results, Table III panel A,
India might have been even better off if we left the Japan
component of world income out of the swap, since with our
unconstrained variance matrix estimate Japanese national income
is extremely volatile, and India winds up bearing some of the
risk of Japanese national income. But, if we left Japan out of
the swap, then India would not receive such a good price for
selling the contracts. Note that India does not pay anything at
all for this insurance of its national income risk, but profits
from it. Japan uses this India/rest-of-the-world swap to reduce
the variance of its own income, since Japanese income uncertainty
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is fairly dominant part of the uncertainty represented in this
swap, even though the weight given to Japan is small.

Even

though Japan was given very little weight by our contract
designer, in consumer surplus terms, in Table III panel A, Japan
benefits almost as much as India does from this contract, and
Japan buys (according to the first column of the

~, matrix)

nearly twice as many contracts as India sells. Japan benefits
especially much because Japan's income is, in our unconstrained
variance matrix estimate, negatively correlated with India's
income. Other contracts that Japan buys are provided largely by
the United States, who sells nearly as many contracts as India
does (the US accepting thereby a 42.30% increase in its small
real per-capita income variance), accepting some Japanese income
risk in exchange for the real $48.17 per contract. Japanese real

per capita income variance is reduced 51.68% by this one
contract; Japan is able to reduce its variance dramatically more
than the 2.75% in the pure variance reduction case because it
pays other countries to take on its risk. Fortunately Japan does
not need to pay very much for this variance reduction, only 1.08%
of Japanese 1990 GDP. Even though the first column of the A
matrix seems to give little weight to Japan, still, given the
small estimated diagonal element of Q corresponding to India
(only 3.79% of the element corresponding to Japan) and the
negative correlation of India with Japan, this contract may
actually be viewed, in variance reduction terms, as more nearly a
risk-management contract for Japan, than one for India. India
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reduces its real per capita income variance by 43.69% with this
contract, a smaller percentage reduction than Japan achieves.
One might have thought that China would show more importance
than India in the Table III panel B utility maximization results,
since it has a larger poor population. However, its population in
1990 was only 36% larger than India's in 1990, and, offsetting
this, its Summers-Heston real per capita income in India was only
45% that of China. Note that neither of the markets in Table III
panel B could be interpreted as designed for Brazil, as was the
second market in the Table III panel A utility maximization
method results. The inclusion of China for Table III panel B
calculations, a country with only 60% the real per capita income
and over seven times the population of Brazil in 1990, has bumped
the market most important to Brazil to the third market (not
shown in Table III panel B). The CIS, which, while its population
was nearly twice that of Brazil, had nearly 40% higher real per

capita income in 1990; has to deal in the fourth market (also not
shown in Table III panel B) for its largest benefits.
To help understand the sometimes great difference between
the columns of the A matrix and the columns of the-~' matrix,
consider the puzzle that in Table III panel B the second contract
appears by the weights Ac2 that define this contract to be
roughly an India/China swap, yet India sells (as shown by the
positions

P2 c)

almost none of this contract, and produces from

this sale the smallest consumer surplus of any country in the
world. One might think that a contract designer would want to
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leave India out of this contract altogether; it would appear that
India is just adding extraneous noise to a contract that would
otherwise be a China/rest-of-the-w orld swap. In fact, however,
the benefit that India receives from this contract is important
to our contract designer given the great weight that India
receives in our social welfare function. Note that contract 1
(defined by the weights Ac 1 ) did not work out to be exactly an
India/rest-of-the-w orld swap, since China was underrepresented in
it. China was given sufficient weight in our social welfare
function that it was treated differently from other countries in
the first contract. With two contracts, India is now able to
achieve an accurate swap of her income with all the world's

P

P

income, since A. 1 15 + A. 2 25 is very nearly such a swap, the
discrepant weight on China standing corrected. China, using the
first two markets together achieves (with

A. 1 P111

+

A. 2 P211 )

nearly a swap with world income too, except that India is
overrepresented in the swap, a fact that is not too damaging to
China given the relatively small contribution that India makes to
the variance of the swap.
To help understand the explained sum of squares over total
sum of squares, consider the first market of Table I, panel A.
The explained sum of squares over total sum of squares is 47.42%
for the United States, indicating that this one security makes it
possible for the United States to get rid of nearly half of its
uncertainty about income, but it offers much less benefit for
Japan as a percent of its variance. Japan derives less benefit
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since its GDP variance is estimated to be three times higher than
that of the next highest country, the US, and its income is
substantially positively correlated with the US; there is in
essence no one who benefits from taking on much of the Japanese
risk.

Japan has essentially exhausted most of its opportunities

to lay off income risk; no one else has much risk to swap
relative to Japan's. To understand this, note that the R 2 when
Japan's present value of real per capita income is regressed on
world present value of real per capita income as measured here is
nearly ninety percent (given the substantial size of the Japanese
economy in the world and positive correlation with most countries
in the world), so Japan has achieved nearly all the possible
variance reduction with these two markets. In other words, with
our unconstrained variance matrix estimate, most of Japanese risk
is market risk which is undiversifiable.
To help understand the consumer surplus figures, note that,
from equation (17), which defines ~c for any given country c, for
any country whose real per capita national income is uncorrelated
with Rq, ~qclXocc = -TPqla; all such countries have the same
consumer surplus as a fraction of base-year income given by (26).
How great this consumer surplus is depends on
value of

Pq

Pq;

if the absolute

is small, there would be little benefit, i. e.,

little profit from insuring other countries against their risks.
For a country for which real per capita national income covaries
{positively or negatively) with Rq, the consumer surplus is
greater if the covariance has the same sign as
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Pq.

If the

covariance is of the opposite sign, there could even be no
benefit at all to this country from trading in the market; the
benefit the country might obtain from receiving an insurance
premium for taking on other countries' risks could be wiped out,
given the covariances, by the extra increased own variance caused
by doing that. Thus, it is clear why the US benefits so little
from its large position in the first market with the utility
maximization contracts, Table III panel A; for the US price works
opposite variance reduction; in this case the US gained on price
but lost on variance. Our results with India in the first market
were the opposite of this case: India's real per capita income
correlates positively with R1 and the price P 1 is also positive.
A major factor tending to keep consumer surpluses down
overall is the discounting in our calculations of the variance
matrix Q caused by our assumed growth rate g of 3.07% per annum
for real per capita incomes. The high historical growth rate
means that marginal utilities of future income are lower, and so
the uncertainty about the distant future matters much less today.
If we alter Table II by substituting a growth rate of g = 0 in
place of the g = 3.07% suggested by recent history, making, as
discussed above, our implied risk-free rate come more in
alignment with historical averages, then our consumer surplus
figures increase dramatically; in Table IV panel B consumer
surplus is increased by at least an order of magnitude, sometimes
more nearly two orders of magnitude, when compared with Table II
panel B. The Table IV results show that there is a possibility
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that consumer surplus may be dramatically higher than we have
estimated with our other tables, given our lack of certainty that
we want to extrapolate the growth trends of the last forty years
into the next forty.

VI. Discussion
Let us concentrate first on the Table II Panel B results
that were derived under the premise that the contract designer
wishes to maximize utility over a long time span and gives a lot
of weight to the big countries. We concentrate on these results
since, to manage standard-of-living risks, such long term
contracts are very important for most people, and since such big
wealthy countries appear to be the more fertile grounds for the
establishment of major new markets.
The best first market to set up was found to be
approximately a swap between the US, on one side, and the Far
East (Japan and China) on the other. In looking at this result,
one may feel that there is a sort of intuitive sense to it, that
some of the biggest economies should share their income risk.
Still, one may wonder why the arrangement took just this form in
our results, and what is it about the estimated variance matrix
that led our methods to this form. One might have thought that
the methods would have led us first to a swap between the US, the
biggest economy of the world, on one side, and the rest of the
world on the other, with the risk shared equally among the other
countries of the world; indeed that is just the first contract we
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would have found had we given much more weight (in our w matrix)
to the United States than to any other country. But taking a
position in such a swap would not be as beneficial to the other
countries of the world, since most would not achieve variance
reduction in their own incomes by taking the other side of such a
swap, each of them being a small part of the swap defined by the
contract. The United States would have to pay them a substantial
amount to make them willing to take on this risk, a payment that
would compensate them for accepting the increased variance; the
increased variance and the payment received work in opposition to
each other so that, in total, expected utilities in these other
countries would not be so much improved. In contrast, the swap
between the United States and Far East produces variance
reduction benefits for both sides of the swap even without any
price payment. The price paid is low; in Table II Panel B the
total dollar value of the open interest (the sum of
countries for which

~le

is positive times the price

~le
P1)

for all
is only

$31 billion, about one quarter of one percent of the twelve
countries' combined GDP in 1990. This example illustrates the
reason that our utility maximization results are basically
similar to the corresponding pure variance reduction results
(comparing Tables I and II): whenever covariances of country
incomes with world income are proportional to country sizes (as
measured by x 0 e), then the utility maximization method will
produce contracts that are simple swaps at zero price, as with
our pure variance reduction method.
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The conclusion that the first contract is a US/Far East swap
rests on our low estimated covariance between the US, on one
side, and Far East on the other; if the US were highly correlated
with the Far East, then we might better create a first contract
that is a swap between the US and the Far East on one side and
other blocks of countries, perhaps Europe, on the other.
Alternatively, if one were to use some form of economic
distances, rather than geographical distances, in our constrained
variance estimation method, then we might possibly, for example,
be led to a swap between advanced countries like the United
States, Japan, and Europe on one 0 side, and less developed
countries, on the other. Such an outcome would require, though,
that the correlations among the advanced countries were quite
high, otherwise the large scale of these economies would itself
tend to result in a first market that is a swap among them.
Considering such possibilities means making careful adjustments
in our estimated variance matrices; the estimates presented here
are hardly definitive evidence about the conditional variance
matrices that we should hold subjectively today.
If we attach more importance to helping poorer countries,
that is, if we follow our utility maximization method to its
logical conclusion without imposing any weights in the social
welfare function,

then the first new market to advocate would

appear to be very nearly one for an India/rest-of-the-world swap,
as shown in Table III Panel B. In this case, it hardly matters
for contract definition whether the United States and Japan are
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correlated with each other or not. With this new market, we would
expect to see a situation in which all other countries
voluntarily share India's risk in proportion to their own
national incomes.
One important lesson from our analysis is that there is a
great difference between the superficial structure of an optimal
contract and the resulting opportunities for risk management that
the contract offers. When we allow our method to give (Table III
Panel B) great weight to the poorest country, the first market, a
swap between India and the world, has the appearance of a market
that would serve only India. In fact, however, the (absolute
value of the) covariance of real per capita national income with
the dividend on this contract is much bigger for the United
States than it is for India 14 , and (with our constrained
variance matrix results) the US buys more contracts than India
sells. The mere fact that we gave so much weight to India in our
method of designing contracts does not mean that only India
benefits. Of course, the markets must offer advantages for richer
countries, since even if our method stresses creating markets for
the benefit of poorer countries, their counterparts in the richer
countries must voluntarily agree to participate in the markets.
In the case of the India/rest-of-world swap, the rest of the

14 with our utility-maximizing constrained-variance-matrix

results, the correlation coefficient, using Q, between US
national income and the dividend in the first market is -0.39,
substantially lower in absolute value than the correlation
coefficient between India and the dividend in the first market,
which is 0.85.
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world benefits so much that in fact they are willing to pay
India, rather than be paid, for bearing India's important (given
her low income levels) exposure to risk. That a product could be
developed that would go a long way towards solving India's risk
problem (reducing her variance by 66.10% in Table III panel B
results) and yet be better than a free good for India is a sort
of discovery that we might never have made had we not the benefit
of the methods developed here.
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FIGURE 1
Ten Year Growth Rates of Real Per Capita GDP, Years Ending 1960-90
Source: Computed from data from Summers and Heston [1991], 1950-90.
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Table I
Optimal Securities Designed Using Pure Variance Reduction Method
w= I, p = 2%
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts
Market 1
C

Ael

Weights
x10- 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
UK

0.82
.22
5.26
.05
-.75
-1. 98
-.30
-2.29
-.82
. 26

~le

Positions
xl0 9
-.20
-.04
-1.34
-.00
.21
.52
.09
.60
.22
-.05

Market 2

11

ESS/TSS
Benefit
% of (j2

Weights Positions
x10- 10
x10 8

~2e

ESS/TSS
Benefit
% of (j2

55.00%
2.60%
47.42%
0.00%
15.99%
2.75%
2.27%
42.90%
16.85%
6.81%

4.01
3.97
1. 06
8.68
3.01
-3.05
3.15
4.40
2.90
3.60

-1. 09
-1. 04
2.76
-7.18
.21
8.12
.03
-1.60
. 36
-.56

16.54%
14.78%
2.01%
79.51%
0.17%
6.68%
0.00%
3.06%
0.44%
7.25%

Ae2

B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts
Market 1
C

Ael

Weights
x10- 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
UK
China
CIS

-.24
-.32
1. 38
-.38
-.56
-.90
-.44
-.48
-.45
-.43
-1. 28
-.60

Market 2

~le

ESS/TSS
Benefit
% of (j2

Weights Positions
x10- 11
xl0 1 o

~2e

ESS/TSS
Benefit
% of (j2

-.35
-.16
-4.12
-.04
.39
1.18
.12
.19
.14
.10
2.06
.49

34.13%
7.20%
48.20%
0.29%
11.64%
24.74%
1. 30%
2.76%
2.20%
0.97%
36.51%
5.72%

.50
.54
-.60
.65
.53
-.63
1. 35
1. 51
1.27
1.29
-1.67
2.16

.06
.03
0.91
-.06
.04
0.94
-0.60
-0.73
-0.54
-0.56
1. 75
-1.24

0.94%
0.25%
2.37%
0.61%
0.10%
15.61%
34.90%
39.98%
32.81%
32.89%
26.13%
36.93%

Positions
xlo 10

Ae2

Notes: Weight Aeq' q = 1,2, is fraction of country c detrended GDP paid
as part of dividend on one security q; position ~qe' q = 1,2, is total
number of securities q the theory predicts will be owned in country c;
ESS/TSS is explained sum of squares over total sum of squares. Source:
Calculations by authors using data 1950-1990 from Summers and Heston
[1991]; see text.
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Table II
Optimal Securities Designed Using Utility Maximization Method
w = Jf'6x0 , p = 2%, a= 3, g = 3.07%
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts
!_Market 1, Price = $46.33_,
C

Aei

Weights
x10- 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
UK

-.05
-.16
.64
-.12
.13
-1. 21
-.26
-.27
-.26
-.00

Pie
Positions
x10 8

Consumer
Surplus
% of GDP

-.56
.02
-4.20
-.20
-1. 50
5.57
.52
.61
.55
-.82

2.25%
0.00%
1.26%
0.17%
4.30%
13.97%
0.67%
0.71%
0.86%
1. 79%

!_Market 2, Price = $20.50_,
Ae2

Weights
xlo- 9

.67
.96
-1.15
1. 72
1. 42
-.59
.79
1. 62
.97
.82

Consumer
~2e
Positions Surplus
x10 8
% of GDP
0.04%
0.69%
0.43%
7.69%
1. 56%
1. 32%
0.02%
2.57%
0.30%
0.05%

.07
- .31
2.45
-1.30
-.91
1. 71
-.09
-1.17
-.33
-.13

B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts
J_Market 1, Price
C

Aei

Weights
x10-i 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
UK
China
CIS

.29
.49
-3.25
.61
.95
1. 64
.72
.78
.74
.70
2.42
1.05

=

Pie
Positions
x10 9
.16
.05
1. 95
-.01
-.18
-.53
-.06
-.10
-.07
-.05
-.93
-.23

$14.42_,
Consumer
Surplus
% of GDP
17.37%
1. 95%
27.14%
0.03%
6.26%
12.52%
0.95%
1. 71%
1. 50%
0.76%
18.50%
3.19%

J_Market 2, Price
Ae2

Weights
x10-i 0
1. 01
1.13
-1.29
1.38
1.10
-1.30
2.76
3.11
2.58
2.64
-3.95
4.55

=

$6.41_,

Consumer
P2e
Positions Surplus
x10 8
% of GDP
.22
.02
4.04
-.40
.07
4.06
-2.68
-3.27
-2.38
-2.48
8.45
-5.65

0.36%
.00%
1.17%
0.72%
0.01%
7.41%
17.55%
20.17%
16.21%
16.54%
15.43%
19.44%

Notes: Weight Aeq' q = 1,2, is fraction of country c detrended GDP paid
as part of dividend on one security q; position Pqe' q = 1,2, is total
number of securities q the theory predicts will be owned in country c;
consumer surpluses, dollar value of expected utility gained (utility of
the T years' income) as a fraction of the first year's GDP, are defined
from positions using (26). Source: Calculations by authors using data
1950-1990 from Summers and Heston [1991]; see text.
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Table III
Optimal Securities Designed Using Utility Maximization Method
w = I, p = 2%, a= 3, g = 3.07%
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts
!_Market 1, Price
C

.Ael

Weights
x10- 9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
.Germany
Italy
UK

-.32
-.32
-.32
-.32
3.96
-.32
-.32
-.32
-.32
-.32

=

$48.17_1

!_Market 2, Price

Positions
xl0 8

Consumer
Surplus
% of GDP

Weights

-.15
.18
-1. 65
.09
-2.33
4.10
.36
-.14
.21
-.67

0.17%
0.24%
0.20%
0.04%
10.34%
7.56%
0.32%
0.04%
0.13%
1.22%

-.25
.20
-.26
4.52
-.08
-.28
-.26
-.26
-.26
-.25

~le

Ae2

x10- 9

=

$8.16_1

Consumer
~2e
Positions Surplus
xl0 8
% of GDP
0.66%
1.18%
0.07%
18.88%
0.00%
1.65%
0.00%
0.01%
0.00%
0.02%

-.30
-.40
1.00
-2.04
-.00
1. 92
-.03
-.07
.01
-.09

B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts
!_Market 1, Price
C

.Ael

Weights
x10- 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
UK
China
CIS

-.12
-.12
-.12
-.12
1. 84
-.12
-.12
-.12
-.12
-.12
-.07
-.12

=

$16.89_1

Positions
x10 8

Consumer
Surplus
% of GDP

.66
.22
7.79
-.05
-5.02
-1.11
.49
.43
.22
.49
-3.88
-.24

3.14%
0.35%
4.34%
0.01%
47.43%
0.55%
0.58%
0.34%
0.14%
0.63%
3.25%
0.03%

~le

Notes: See Notes to Table II.
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!_Market 2, Price
Ae2

Weights
x10- 10
.91
1. 02
.91
1.16
6.88
.89
.91
.91
.92
.92
-6.81
1. 04

=

$3.80_1

Consumer
~2e
Positions Surplus
x10 9
% of GDP
-.08
-.04
-.89
-.04
-.03
.42
-.11
-.12
-.09
-.11
1.26
-.17

4.49%
1. 30%
5.64%
0.84%
0.20%
7.87%
3.01%
2.76%
2.50%
2.97%
34.53%
1. 72%

Table IV
Optimal Securities Designed Using Utility Maximization Method
w = lPax0 , p = 2%, a= 3, g = 0%
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts
I_Market 1, Price = $56.71_1
C

.Ael

Weights
x10- 10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
UK

-.27
-.91
3.87
-.61
.98
-7.67
-1. 53
-1. 61
-1.54
.05

1-Market 2, Price = $20.07_1

Positions
xl0 8

Consumer
Surplus
% of GDP

Weights

-.87
-.02
-6.41
-.41
-2.54
9.02
.81
.92
.82
-1.30

5.48%
0.00%
2.94%
0.78%
12.23%
36.56%
1.59%
1.58%
1. 93%
4.54%

.44
.64
-.78
1.15
.87
-.35
.53
1.10
.65
.53

~le

Ae2

x10- 9

Consumer
~2e
Positions Surplus
xl0 8
% of GDP
.12
-.48
3.78
-2.03
-1.18
2.50
-.15
-1.87
-.52
-.16

0.11%
1. 63%
1.02%
18.71%
2.65%
2.81%
0.06%
6.61%
0.79%
0.07%

B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts
1-Market 1, Price = $42.62_1
C

.Ael

Weights
x10- 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Canada
Mexico
USA
Brazil
India
Japan
France
Germany
Italy
UK
China
CIS

.41
.72
-4.64
.90
1. 35
2.33
1.05
1.14
1.07
1.02
3.43
1. 51

~le

Positions
xlo 10
.11
.03
1. 37
-.01
-.12
-.37
-.05
-.07
-.05
-.04
-.64
-.16

Consumer
Surplus
% of GDP
884.56%
84.44%
1345.49%
4.96%
283.20%
607.44%
54.65%
92.62%
81. 74%
44.10%
888.78%
161.93%

Notes: See Notes to Table II.
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I_Market 2, Price = $20.18_1
Ae2

Weights
x10- 11
1. 41
1. 60
-1. 76
1. 90
1. 53
-1.85
3.88
4.40
3.62
3.72
-5.63
6.42

Consumer
~2e
Positions Surplus
xl0 9
% of GDP
.16
.01
2.79
-.25
.06
2.87
-1. 89
-2.32
-1. 67
-1. 76
6.01
-4.00

18.68%
.03%
55.86%
28.15%
0.67%
370.58%
877.19%
1015.38%
805.81%
828.15%
779.60%
975.29%

Symbol List
Note: Matrices and vectors are represented as bold-faced symbols,
scalars are not bolded.
A. Latin Symbols
A -C x Q matrix whose cqth element is the share of country e's income
that is included in the dividend paid on income component security q.

c -Country number; countries are ordered and each is given a number c,
these numbers range from 1 to C.
C

-Total number of countries studied here.

D -C x C matrix constructed so that for any C x 1 element vector x Dx
equals the demeaned vector x, that is, a vector whose cth element equal
to xc minus the mean of the C elements of x.
F -QxC matrix, Fqc is the dollar value for country c of the utility
increase achieved by establishing market q, as a fraction of its base
year income.

g

-Anticipated growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product.

G

-cxc

diagonal matrix whose tth diagonal element equals

( (l+p) (l+g)a+l)-t.

-C x C matrix such that XM is the vector of regression residuals;
the cth element of XM is the residual in a regression of country e's
income on world income.

M

M -C

x C matrix such that XM
over each countries' share in
the income of country c minus
defined as world income times

is the vector of excess national incomes
world income; the cth element of XM is
e's share in world income, the latter
x 0 c/(L(c=l, .. ,C)x0 c).

P -Q x 1 vector whose qth element is the price of income component
security q, i. e., the amount that is paid each year, t = 1, .. . ,T,
according to the contract at time O from longs in the contract to the
shorts; elements can be both positive or negative.

Q -Number of markets for income component securities defined here; i.
e., the number of distinct contract types available for use in risk
management.
R -In pure variance reduction case (section I of paper), a 1 x Q
vector, whose qth element is the total dividends, over T years, paid by
income component security q. In the utility case maximization case
(Section II of paper), a T x Q matrix, whose tqth element is the total
dividends paid in year t by contract q. In both cases, R = XA.
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S -Social welfare; in pure variance reduction case (section I of
paper) it is a weighted sum of variances. In the utility maximization
case (section II of paper) it is a weighted sum of utilities.
t

-Year, contract year is 0, first year following contract is 1.

T -Number of years in contract; contract pays dividends from year 1 to
year T.

T -Present value of T-year annuity paying $1 each year using discount
factor v = 1/((l+p) (l+g)a-l), so that T = (v-vT+l)/(1-v). With g=3.07%
and p=2%, T=lO gives T=6.60, T=40 gives T=ll.48; changing g to 0, T=lO
gives T=8.98, T=40 gives T=27.36.
Ute-Felicity, at year t, of country c.
Uc -Utility of country

c, the present value from 1 to T of felicities

Ute·

w -C x C diagonal matrix, whose cth diagonal element is the weight
given to country c by the contract designer in the social welfare
function used to derive the optimal income component securities.

x 0 c-National income of country cat the point of linearization at year
0 for the felicity function, nonstochastic. In our data, x 0 c is gross
domestic product (total, not per capita) of country c in 1990, measured
in 1985 dollars; for the CIS, 1989 gross domestic product was used.

x 0 -C x C diagonal matrix, whose cth diagonal element is Xoc·
-In the pure variance reduction case (Section I of the paper), Xis
a 1 x C vector whose cth element is the demeaned present value of real
per capita income (gdp), from years 1 through T, of country c,
discounted by p, and multiplied by population of country c in year 0.
In the utility maximization case (Section II of the paper), Xis the T
x C matrix whose tcth element is demeaned real per capita income of
country cat year t multiplied by population in year 0.
X

Yoe-Per capita income at time O in country c, equal to x 0 c divided by
population at time O of country c.
Yo

-c

x C diagonal matrix, whose cth diagonal element is Yoe·

B. Greek Symbols

a

-Risk aversion parameter, assumed to be the same for all countries.

~
-Q x C matrix whose qcth element is the total number of the qth
income component securities demanded by individuals in country c.
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y -C x 1 vector whose cth element is the slope coefficient in a
regression of country e's income on total world income

7

-C x 1 vector whose cth element is the share of country e's income
in total world income in the base year.
t

-C x 1 vector, all of whose elements equal one.

Aq -A Lagrangian multiplier for the contract designer's problem,
corresponding to the constraint that Aq'QA.q = l, where Aq is the qth
column of A;
also the qth eigenvalue of a matrix definea in that
problem.
A

-Q x Q diagonal matrix, whose qth diagonal element is

Aq.

µ

-Q x 1 vector, whose elements are Lagrangian multipliers for the
constraints that the Q markets clear.

p

-Subjective rate of time preference in utility function.

-C x C matrix. In the pure variance reduction case (Section II of
paper) this is the variance, conditional on information at year 0, of
the present value of income from year 1 to T. In the utility
maximization case (Section III of paper) Q is E 0X'GX.

Q

-c x C matrix, the variance, conditional on information at year 0,
of real per capita income in year t times population in year 0.

Qt
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Comparison of Basic Relations
As Between Pure Variance Reduction and
Utility Maximization Cases
Pure Variance Reduction

=

R

Utility Maximization
R = XA

XA

P = -a.A'Ot ( Tt 'x0 t) - 1
= -i~'Q + TP'x0 /a)
!. = A X 0 t = 0

P = 0 (P not used)
p = -A'Q = -A'OM
Pt= A'Ot = 0
PA= -I

I

DM = D, MD = M
A = -.Mwy-ax-1~, A-1
_

p = PM= PD
= 0,

t

=~

--

0

0

A = MA
~ = ~M = ~D

XA = (XM)A
M = z - t < t 'nt ) - 1 t 'n

M'OM

-A'OM

A= -I

DM = D, MD= M
A = -Mwf3 'A- 1
A = MA

Mt

=

xi. = (XM)A
M = I - t ( t 'x0 t ) - 1 t 'x0
Mt= 0, t'x0M = O
M' x 0 M = x 0 M
XM = matrix, tcth element is

'OM = 0

vector of residuals in re
gression of country c total T-year difference between country e's
income at year t and its share
income on T-year world income.
of world income at year t.

XM =

A'.Qi..OA =

M'.Q.Mwf3

I

=

Pwf3'
pA

=

A

I

Calle the matrix of first Q
eigenvectors of w· 5 M'0Mw· 5
normalized so that e'e = I,
then P' = w-· 5 eA· 5 , where A is
diagonal matrix
of the eigenvalues.
Adding .kx0 tt'x0 to Q for any
scalar k > 0 has no effect
on A or ~Dwyoax;/~ I = -DAA
If w = Y&'XJJ
~I
= -DAA
If Q = C-1:
&'OM = ~~' and
A~= -Mand

Adding kntt'Q to Q for any
scalar k > 0 has no effect
on A or p.
Dwf3' = -DAA
If w = I:
P' = -DAA
If Q = C-1:
M'OM = pp' and
AP= -Mand

z

+

AP = t y <r= < t 'nt) - 1 t 'n)

I+A~ = t'Y ('Y=(t'x0 t)- 1 t'x0 )

If Q oc (proportional to) x 0 , then M =Mand P = O
More generally t'n oc t'x0 (sum columns proportional) iff M=M.
If M = M then P = 0 .
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